Whilst looking at the ways in which I could represent objects artistically, I came to what seemed to be an irreducible claim about objects that they are bound by three distinctive features. The geometric/mathematic features of the object, the scientific/empirical features of the object and the pragmatic/utile feature of the object. Over the course of the next few weeks, I started to see this tripartite pattern playing out wherever I applied it. The epistemological argument, the ontological argument, the argument of truth claims, etc. all seemed to be able to be subdivided into one of these three claims. The abstract claim, the sensory claim and the utile claim. So I decided to explore this further... In this series of blogs I am laying out some thoughts as to how this trialectic could be presented and eventually (hopefully) what it could mean when we start to discuss and defend arguments. Because, it seems to me, that when many people start to argue about a particular topic in question, they are using reasoning based on one of these positions and if they reach an impasse in their line of thought, it tends to be because they simply have two different kinds of belief with regard to truth.
Why are philosopher's so wedded to the idea that there is single Theory of Everything (TOE) with regards to truth?
The motivation for such a theory seems to be connected to the utility of such a quest in the field of science. Scientifically speaking, having a TOE means that pseudo-scientific propositions are less likely to be regarded as fact, nor unfounded beliefs given the same standing as rigorously founded theories. The TOE also provides an elegant destination to head towards with regards to the philosophy of truth and posits that if we could only uncover this theory, everything would be solved. Despite this, the idealistic nature of such a theory may be much greater than the proof that such a theory exists. Scientists consistently pass over the question of the truth as something which the philosophers need to figure out in the background while they get on with the important task of determining what the truths are. However, what difference does it make to their figures if the abstract truths of mathematics are unfounded? Scientists also consistently pass over the indiscernibility of negative claims and the problems of counterfactuals as non-issues which have led the general public's distrust in science and the move towards an ever greater reliance on philosophical relativism. Within the political sphere, at the polarised positions of the left and the right, the idea of truth being popularised as a relative term which has dominated the discourse around the issue.
My proposition is to state that truth is relative, but perspective.
Under my definition, truth is a pluralised concept, divided into three distinct aspects that are at the same time both mutually exclusive categories as well as being convergently referential. From each of these perspectives, you have a hierarchy of truths. The perspective determines the value system within which it may be judged whereby theories are positioned according to their truthfulness, within the hierarchy.
Truth is a plural concept, specifically portioned out into three perspectives.
Mathematic truths, Scientific truths and Pragmagmatic truths. Each of these I will endeavour to explain further in the course of these blog articles. I will also seek to show how this trialect model is found in many other spheres and can be helpful to ground our understanding of the world in many different fields.