3. Epistemology

The categories of knowledge that I described in my ontology, match very neatly onto ways in which we formulate our knowledge about the world - our epistemology. The epistemic framework that we use, when we seek to talk about truth is very influential to the way in which we understand the world around us. Indeed, I will go on to argue that it is the ENTIRE way in which we construct our world and we should recognise the one we are using before we seek to justify our positions, with regards to another point of view. For now, however, let us match these ontological categories on to the epistemological categories to which they are associated.

1. Geometry & Idealism - The logic of geometry is the very basis of a mathematic understanding of the world and the way in which the mathematic model of reality is constructed. The logical universe is not only complete and unified but also absolute. This is essentially an Idealist epistemology from which we can state non-negotiable truths about the world from which there is no doubt, even if the world were ordered in another way, or if humans evolved an entirely different way of thinking. This is in sharp contrast with; 

2. Chemistry & Empiricism - The empirical world is a constantly developing and uncovering new truths. The empiric rationale is founded on the concept that the human mind is able to both perceive the truths about reality and fully comprehend them. However, this isn't to state that this is ALL that humans can conceive of. Under an empirical statement of beliefs, we conceive of truth as though it were as yet undiscovered realities about the world. This is very different to; 

3. Utility & Pragmatism - Pragmatic truths are distinct in that they hold a specifically practical relationship to humans and more specifically ourselves. A pragmatic truth holds utility as the ultimate value, such that some things are considered truer than others on the basis that their effect on the human, produces the intended result. If there is a fallacy found in a pragmatic sense, the whole edifice of the system that was used to describe the result comes crumbling down.

Now, these three ways of representing reality are still nothing new. I am not proposing to introduce a new epistemology into the mix. Instead, what I wish to do is to argue for the way in which these three epistemologies can be held, at the same time, yet in referent to one, indistinguishable object. Which I will now go on to explain further;